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Book Review 
Allen, Douglas W. and Dean Lueck. (2004). The Nature of the Farm—Contracts, Risk, 
and Organization in Agriculture. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 266 pp., $22.00. 
ISBN 0262511851. 
The conventional wisdom about the future of family farming in North America is that it is 
a bleak one. Like any other family firms, family farms are not immune to industrialization 
and eventually all stages of food production will be in the hands of large corporations. 
The poultry industry has become the poster-industry for the corporate take-over of food 
production and the guide to what is in store for the rest of agriculture. That, among other 
theories about organizational features of North American agriculture, is closely examined 
by Allen and Lueck’s Nature of the Farm—Contracts, Risk, and Organization in Agriculture. 
As the reader can guess, the leading title of the book is a take on Ronald Coase’s classical 
article, The Nature of the Firm, obviating the book’s use of the transaction cost approach to 
explain contracts, risk, and organization in agriculture. 
In contrast to the “principal-agent” approach, where risk sharing between risk-averse 
contracting parties is the motive for contracts, the transaction cost approach Allen and 
Lueck use bypasses risk preferences by justifiably assuming risk neutrality and focuses 
instead on the tradeoff between incentives offered by contracts. In doing so, the au-
thors develop models that are more consistent with actual farming practices in North 
America and with the data than risk-sharing models. Chapter 2 provides a thorough 
discussion of those farming practices. Chapters 6 and 7 in part II of the book provide 
the empirical evidence against the risk-sharing explanation of contracts using data on 
individual contracts. 
Less obvious from the title, however, is that the “Nature” Allen and Lueck have in 
mind is Mother Nature. Through its unpredictable and predictable roles in farm produc-
tion, Mother Nature “is the fundamental force that shapes the incentives and transaction 
costs that, in turn, ultimately shape agricultural organization” (p. viii). The unpredictable 
role provides the uncertainty that allows contracting parties to exploit one another and 
literally blame it on the weather. For example, farm tenants can exploit landowners by 
underreporting output, undersupplying effort, and mismanaging the soil. Engaging in 
and preventing such hidden actions give rise to transaction costs. To mitigate those costs, 
contracting parties chose from a menu of contracts. In part I of the book, chapter 3 exam-
ines various forms of those contracts. Chapters 4 and 5 use a transaction model to empiri-
cally examine the determinants of choice between crop share and cash rent contracts, and 
the determinants of the respective shares of landowners and farmers in the costs of inputs 
in a crop share contract. What we learn is that a major reason for the simplicity of agri-
cultural contracts is low-cost enforcement because of “the character of the farming econ-
omy.” In addition, consistent with the transactions costs model, the choice between crop 
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share and cash contracts and the division of outputs and inputs depend on how close a 
contract brings the contracting parties to a relationship that mimics vertical integration. 
The predictable or systematic role of Mother Nature restricts farm production pro-
cesses. The biological clocks of crops are preset so there are only so many cycles of crop 
production, so many stages and tasks between the seed and final output. In such a set-
ting, gains from task specialization are limited because tasks are not as repetitive as they 
are in factory-style production, timeliness of tasks is critical, and performing those tasks 
through contracts increases moral hazard costs. Chapters 8 and 9 in part III of the book, 
respectively, examine how Mother Nature affects farmers’ decision to own or contract 
over the control of assets, and how it shapes the type of agricultural organization. 
With respect to asset ownership versus contracting, the analysis makes it clear why, for 
example, farmers own rather rent expensive combines, which are used only a few weeks 
a year. With respect to type of organization, the analysis also makes clear why seasonality 
results in agricultural organization as simple as a family farm or as complex as a factory-
style corporate farm. The lower the number of crop cycles, the shorter and less frequent 
the production stages are, the less tasks are within the stages, and the more critical is the 
timing between stages, the more prone is the farmer to moral hazard and agricultural 
production will be in the hands of a family farm. Production of annual grain crops is one 
example. Therefore, it should be no surprise that 80% of wheat farms are family farms. 
Wheat production is also less likely to go the route of feedlot cattle, hogs, and poultry fac-
tory-style production unless a technology comes along that eliminates seasonal forces in 
wheat as it did in livestock and allows growing wheat indoors. 
Agricultural economists interested in contracts and organization in farming in general, 
and transactions costs economics, in particular, will find this book a valuable text in their 
classes and a valuable reference for their research. What is remarkable about the book is 
that it combines rigor with relevance and confronts theory with data. That is what agri-
cultural economics research is meant to be. 
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